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In this paper the impact of public policies such as subsidies and taxation on invasive 
species management is explored in a Markov chain process framework. Private agents 
react to public incentives based upon their long term expected profits and have the option 
of taking measures such as abatement, monitoring and reporting.  Conditions for perverse 
incentives are derived.  The impact of sequencing of taxation and subsides on spread of 
risks  is  explored.    One  key  finding  of  this  paper  is  that  excessive  regulation  may 
sometimes exacerbate the invasive species problem 
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It is generally acknowledged that the 
threat  of  invasive  species  cannot  be 
eliminated but that the risks and the 
potential  damages  can  be  reduced 
considerably  through  effective 
management. A key ingredient to the 
effective  management  of  the  risks 
from  invasives  is  the  degree  of 
private  participation.    However 
inducing  private  participation  for 
controlling  the  invasives  could 
become  a  major  challenge  to  the 
policy makers.  This is so as private 
objectives  greatly  differ  from  the 
social  objectives,  given  that  private 
agents  do  not  incorporate  the 
consequences  of  their  actions  on 
society.  Further, the limited ability of 
regulating  agents  to  monitor  private 
agent’s actions reduces the choice set 
and efficacy  of such  public  policies.  
The difficulty is further compounded 
when dealing with situations, as is the 
case with invasive species, where the 
manifestations  of  adverse 
consequences  are  sometimes  far 
removed  from  when  the  action 
occurred.   
A  growing  concern  for  policy 
makers  attempting  to  solicit  private 
participation  in  the  fight  against 
invasives  is  the  prospect  of 
engendering  perverse  incentives. 
Perverse  incentives  provide  benefits 
to  the  targeted  agents  from  taking 
measures that are counter productive 
towards  achieving  the  social 
objectives. Given the uncertainty over 
biological  parameters  related  to  the 
pests,  and  behavioral  parameters 
related to the private agents, (such as 
degree  of  monitoring  and  control 
efforts)  certain  policies  of  the 
regulating  agent  (such  as 
compensation for destruction of pest-
infested  resources)  may  provide 
perverse incentives. Figure (1) shows 
the  indemnity  payments  for  various 
pests  by  the  USDA  which  have 
steeply  increased  over  time.  
Concerns  have  been  raised  over  the 
extent  of  role  played  by  perverse 
incentives  in  this  increase  in 
payments.  Another example where it 
has  been  alleged  that  perverse 
incentives could have played a role is 
of  the  protracted  time  it  took  to 
control the spread of the BSE disease 
in  the  UK.    While  there  is  no 
documented evidence to support such 
claims  there,  it  has  been  suggested 
that because the government followed 
a policy of generously compensating 
only those farmers whose cattle were 
affected by BSE or located within the 
prescribed  eradication  region,  those 
who  were  left  out  but  faced  similar 
loss  of  market  opportunities  had  an 
incentive  to  spread  the  disease 
amongst their cattle. 
A number of studies exist that have 
explored  the  various  economic  
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dimensions  of  managing  the  invasive 
species.    These  include  Eiswerth  and 
Johnson  (2002),  Eiswerth  and  Van 
Kooten (2002), McAusland and Costello 
(2004), Olson, and Roy (2002), Perrings 
et al. (2000), Settle and Shogren (2002), 
etc.  However, the authors are not aware 
of  any  study  that  delves  into  the 
behavioral  aspects  of  inducing  or 
influencing private participation through 
public policies.  Yet, there exists a great 
need  to  understand  the  implications  of 
such public policies both from the point 
of view of increased demand for public 
accountability  as  well  as  ensuring  that 
the ultimate outcomes are in congruence 
with what was anticipated.    
There are a number of key questions 
confronting  the  policy  maker  while 
deciding  how  best  to  influence  private 
behavior.    Foremost  is  the  choice 
between  taxes  and  subsidies  or  a 
combination  of  both.    Due  to  political 
considerations and the fact that in most 
cases it is difficult to assign the blame of 
pest  infestation  and  spread  on  private 
resource owners, public policies so far 
have mainly resorted to subsidies, thus 
increasing  the  chances  of  perverse 
motives.  In certain cases where farms 
have  been  quarantined  without  any 
compensation being paid to the farmer, 
the policy maker has been taken to court 
over losses from quarantine.  Second is 
related to the extent of effectiveness of 
such policies in terms of achieving the 
social objectives.  Third is whether such 
policies induce any further aggravation 
of the pest problem by providing wrong 
incentives to the agent.   
In this paper we explore all the 
three questions to a certain extent while 
primarily focusing on the practicability 
of  the  policy  implications  that  emerge 
from the analysis.  In order to achieve 
this,  we  model  the  behavioral  risks 
involved  with  invasive  species 
management in a Markov chain process 
framework.    The  usefulness  of  this 
approach has already been demonstrated 
in  ecological  modeling  literature  as  it 
offers a very convenient and transparent 
way  of  representing  uncertainty 
evolution through transition probability 
matrices.    Recently  some  suggestions 
have been made regarding the utility of 
Markov  chain  methods  in  modeling 
ecological-economic  phenomenon, 
specifically  the  invasive  species  (See 
Perrings 2003 and 1998).   
This paper is divided into two main 
sections;  theoretical  framework  and 
numerical simulations. In the theoretical 
section we briefly discuss the analytical 
framework  and  allude  to  some  of  the 
major findings of our investigation. The 
numerical section puts more structure on 
the theoretical model and derives some 
results  that  are  not  easily  discernible 




Our  analysis  involves  optimization  of 
private economic benefits in presence of 
taxation and indemnities.  The economic  
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benefits,  however,  are  modeled  as  the 
long  run  benefits  that  accrue  from 
adoption of various levels of monitoring 
and  prevention  activities.    These  long 
run benefits are derived as a function of 
the  fraction  of  time  private  resources 
spend in each of the various ‘states’ of 
infestation ranging from non-infestation 
to  high  levels  of  infestation.    Societal 
welfare may be related to the fraction of 
time the resources spend in each ‘state’ 
as  a  combined  sum  of  the  resource 
owners’ revenues and the impact on the 
‘rest-of-the-world’  from  damages  that 
these ‘states’ may cause in the event of 
species  escaping  outside.    Optimal 
monitoring  and  prevention  efforts  are 
first derived under a policy of taxation 
and  subsidies  and  their  impact  is 
explored with respect to the change in 
societal  risks  from  pests.    The  role  of 
subsidy in providing perverse incentives 
in  terms  of  reducing  the  risks  of 
detection and level of preventive efforts 
is  explored.    Unfortunately,  public 
policies  are  mostly  reactive  and  rarely 
prepare in advance for pest-infestations.  
In  such  a  scenario,  one  key  issue  of 
concern  is  whether  regulatory  policies 
can  effectively  dissuade  a  resource 
owner  from  continuing  with  his 
production  plan  and  risk  subsequent 
detection  rather  than  report  an 
infestation at the outset.  It turns out that 
the absolute level of taxation can play a 
key  role  in  inducing  such  a  behavior.  
Consequently,  threshold  level  of 
reporting-inducing  taxation  is  derived.  
This threshold must also have an upper 
bound so that the resource owner is not 
stifled in his entrepreneurial efforts due 
to a very high level of taxation.     
When multiple states of infestation 
are observable, the regulator has a wider 
choice  of  affecting  private  behavior 
through  a  mix  of  ‘carrot  and  stick’ 
policies.  Such policies are often ad-hoc 
and are either related to economic value 
of resources concerned or exogenously 
specified.  Under such circumstances, an 
important  question  of  concern  is 
whether  sequencing  of  taxation  and 
subsidies  matters  in  terms  of  affecting 
private behavior.  Our analysis reveals 
that  it  does  matter  and  some  of  the 
harshest policies such as all-out taxation 
may  perform  poorly  in  terms  of 
achieving a low risk of spread of pests 
as  compared  to  those  policies  that 
combine  both  subsidies  and  taxation.  
Surprisingly,  it  implies  that  over-
taxation  can  exacerbate  the  risk  of 
invasive species spread.  Such a result is 
governed by several factors such as the 
differences  in  revenue  from  different 
states of the resource, risks of detection, 
abatement  costs,  etc.  under  various 
states  of  infestation.  It  highlights  the 
role of key parameters in influencing the 
dynamics  of  private  decision-making.  
Similarly, another result emphasizes the 
fact  that  an  all-out  subsidies  program 
may  not  increase  risks  as  much  as  a 
mismatched  policy  of  subsidy  and 
taxation.    In  the  model  below  we 
formalize these ideas.  
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 Model  
 
Consider  a  private  resource  R  that 
yields per period economic returns to its 
owner  at  the  rate  ) (R p .    These 
resources  however  face  the  threat  of 
invasion  from  a  certain  species  (or  a 
class of species) to which the resources 
serve  as  a  host,  thus  aiding  in  their 
further  growth  and  spread.    Upon 
infestation, the per-period revenues from 
the  resources  may  decline  and  are  a 
function  of  the  state  of  infestation  X.  
Further,  the  private  owner  is  not  the 
only  one  faced  with  this  threat  of 
invasion.  The  pests  threaten  to  spread 
into a wider region outside the private 
property  thus  causing  potential 
economic and ecological damages at a 
much wider scale.  As a consequence, 
there is a role for public intervention, as 
the  private  resource  owner  has  no 
incentives  to  consider  the  threats  of 
spread beyond his resources. 
We model the dynamics related with 
the  arrival,  control,  monitoring, 
detection and re-growth of species (both 
hosts  and  pests)  as  a  continuous  time 
Markov process, which assumes that the 
inter-arrival time of these events follows 
an  exponential  distribution.  While  a 
more  realistic  assumption  may  be 
modeling  such  events  as  semi-Markov 
processes,  (as  they  allow  for 
independent  allocation  of  distribution 
function for events based upon empirical 
observation)  we  refrain  from  such  a 
complication in this paper.  Under this 
framework, the arrival rate of pests is a 
defined as  l , the control or death rate 
as d , the detection rate as d and the re-
growth  of  host  species  following 
destruction  as  q
1.  The  Markov  chain 
process  is  defined  by  the  set  of  states 
and the instantaneous rates as described 
above.  The states of the above system 
are  defined  as  {R,  X  and  0}.  R  is  the 
state  before  any  invasion,  X  is  the 
invaded state and 0 is the state when the 
resources  of  the  private  agent  are 
completely destroyed due to aggressive 
public intervention (such as quarantine). 
The dynamics of the process involving 
infestation,  control  and  resource 
destruction  and  re-growth  is  shown  in 
figure 2.  
Assume that there is a regulator who 
is  able  to  observe  whether  the  private 
resources  have  been  infected  or  not.  
However, this observation requires some 
kind  of  effort  on  the  regulator,  and 
detection is not possible with certainty. 
That is, detection is probabilistic, with 
its  rate  given  by  d.        Further,  let’s 
assume that the social costs of disease 
infestation  on  this  private  property  are 
high, as a consequence, the regulator is 
obliged  to  destroy  the  host  species 
(which  yield  economic  rewards  to  the 
private owner) on the private property.  
                                                 
1 See Kulkarni (1995) for a discussion of 
continuous time Markov chain processes.  
Also, the arrival rate could be an 
endogenous function of several factors as 
modeled later on.    
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The  regulator  can  also  choose  to 
compensate the resource owner for the 
destruction of his resources for the time 
his resources remain destroyed and thus 
do not yield any benefits
2.  Also, assume 
that the resources, once fully destroyed, 
can  be  reestablished  at  the  rate 
q without  any  additional  costs
3.  
Alternatively, resources can grow back 
instantaneously  after  a  quarantine  time 
distributed  with  parameter  q .    The 
agent  takes  into  account  the  long  run 
average  revenues  and  costs  of  his 
actions  while  deciding  over  level  of 
efforts.    
The steady state probabilities of 
the fraction of time spent in each state, 
) (R p , ) (X p and  ) 0 ( p  are determined 
by using the fact that the rate of arrival 
and exit from a state must be equal in 
the long run
4.  From figure 2, this gives 
us three equations in three unknowns as: 
 
(1)  d q l x p p R p + = 0 ) (  
 
(2)  l d R x x p d p p = +  
 
                                                 
2 There are other forms of compensating the 
farmer such as direct payments for the value 
of the destroyed resource, uniform subsidies, 
etc.   
3 Here, the costs of resource destruction are 
implicitly accounted for in the amount of 
time spent in the state 0.   
4 See Kulkarni (1995) for more details on 
the methodology. 
(3)  d p p x = q 0  
However, one of the equations is 
redundant, and therefore we make use of 
the additional fact that the sum of the 
fractions of time spent in each states 
would be one: 
 
(4)  1 0 = + + p p p x R  
 
Solving the above system of equations 
we can derive the steady state 
probability values as: 
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Average  expected  benefits  in  the  long 
run would be maximized when the agent 
sets his objective function as: 
 
Maximize with respect to abatement (a) 




                                                 
5 Due to no inter-temporal discounting 
assumed here, we ignore the lost revenues 
from being in state 0.    
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First order condition with respect to 
monitoring and abatement imply: 
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The  first  order  conditions  with 
respect  to  monitoring  requires  that  the 
marginal increase in the amount of time 
spent in each of the states be worth their 
cost in the long run.   It is intuitive that 
if the arrival rate of species is decreasing 
in preventive efforts, then the expected 
amount  of  time  spent  in  the  invaded 
state  x would be falling and the amount 
time  spent  in  the  un-invaded  state  R 
increasing in monitoring efforts.  Note 
that the rewards from being in any of the 
states  are  directly  proportional  to  the 
time spent in that state.    Similarly, the 
allocation  of  abatement  efforts  in  the 
long run is decided by the effectiveness 
of such efforts in affecting the average 
time spent in each of the states.   
Next, consider the impact of public 
intervention on private behavior.  Upon 
detection, the regulator has the option of 
using monetary rewards or punishment.  
In  this  simple  model  without  multiple 
stages  of  infestation,  it  is  hard  to 
combine  both  the  options 
simultaneously.  Therefore, for now, we 
assume  that  the  regulator  can  either 
offer  rewards  or  taxes  upon  detection.  
Under  the  above  assumptions  we 
analyze the impact of public policy on 
abatement and monitoring efforts.  The 
private agent’s new optimization under 
taxes t, can be written as: 
 
(11)  Max: 
) 0 ( ) ( * )} (
) ( { ) ( * )} ( ) ( {
tp X p a c
X R p m c R
- -
+ - p p
 
 
Note that besides the taxes, the private 
owner’s costs of being in state zero are 
also determined by the amount of time 
spent  in  that  state.    This  way  of 
modeling taxation makes the costs to the 
farmer  dependent  not  only  upon  the 
detection rate (which is a function of the 
regulator’s  efforts)  but  also  upon  the 
biological  features  of  the  resources 
concerned.    For  instance,  if  q is  high, 
the  resources  would  grow  back  faster 
thus  inflicting  less  costs  to  the  owner.  
Alternatively  when  q   is  construed  as 
the rate of elimination of quarantine, the 
taxes t are exogenously specified by the 
regulator as a function ofq .  Modeling 
taxation  this  way  allows  us  to 
incorporate  the  variations  in  silvi-
cultural  aspects  of  the  affected  or 
threatened  hosts.    Further,  indemnity 
payments that do not cover the full costs  
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of the destroyed resources may also be 
considered as a form of taxation.  The 
first  order  conditions  with  respect  to 
monitoring  and  abatement  efforts  can 
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Note from equation (7) that p (0) is a 
function not only of the detection rate d 
and the growth rate q , but also of the 
arrival rate of species  l .  This is so as 
the more time the resources spend in the 
infested  state (x),  the  higher  would be 
the  rate  of  transformation  into  the 
resource  destruction  state  (0).    As  a 
consequence,  the  effect  of  increased 
monitoring and abatement would be to 
lower the rate of arrival into state (0).  It 
would be optimal to increase monitoring 
and  abatement  as  compared  to  the 
previous  case  of  no  taxation  simply 
because now there is a cost of spending 
time  in  the  state  when  resources  are 
destroyed.    Therefore,  taxation  would 
lead  to  increased  monitoring  and 
abatement, thus reducing the time spent 
in  the  state  p(x)  too.    However,  the 
degree of effect would be governed by 
several  factors.    First,  as  discussed 
above,  q would  play  a  key  role  in 
determining  the  cost  of  detection.    A 
higher  q would mitigate the impact of 
public intervention, as the system would 
bounce back out of quarantine at a faster 
rate.  Note that an increase in d, all else 
remaining  constant,  would  lead  to  a 
reduction  in  profits  by  increasing  the 
time  spent  in  the  infested  state  and 
therefore  offer  additional  incentives  to 
the resource owner towards monitoring 
and abatement efforts.  However, if the 
average revenues in the infested state do 
not fall substantially as compared to the 
un-infested  state,  the  level  of  taxation 
that  would  induce  the  same  levels  of 
monitoring  and  abatement  as  before 
would  have  to  rise,  as  the  costs  of 
spending less time in the infested state 
are lower in terms of forgone revenues.  
Consider  a  special  case  in  which  the 
pests are a nuisance only to the public 
resources  surrounding  the  private 
resource, whereas the private resources 
are not affected by the invasion.  In such 
a  case  ) (X p   could  be  greater  than 
) (R p   if  resources  grow  over  time 
(assuming  the  arrival  rate  of  invasive 
species is synchronous with the growth 
rate  of  private  resource).    Now  the 
incentives  to  reach  the  state  of 
infestation  would  be  much  higher  by 
reducing monitoring and abatement.   As 
a  consequence,  the  level  of  taxation 
needs to be increased even further.    
 
Private Responses to Public Incentives for Invasive Species Management 
Farm & Business: The Journal of the Caribbean Agro-Economic Society (CAES) 
(2007). 7 (1) 80-102 
88 
The  policy  of  taxation,  though 
effective,  may  not  be  feasible  under 
most  situations  concerning  invasive 
species  management.  This  is  primarily 
because  the  policy  assumes  that  the 
regulator  has  exclusive  rights  over 
managing  the  ‘risk  of  spread’  and 
therefore can stop the private agent from 
propagating it.  However, in most cases 
the private agent may be the producer of 
the  risk  only  to  the  extent  that  his 
resources  act  as  hosts  to  the  invading 
species.  Even there the regulator may 
not  be  able  to  pin  down  the 
responsibility of spread entirely on the 
private  agent  as  this  issue  is  entirely 
different  from  the  case  of  pollution 
generating firms that generate pollution 
as an externality which is directly linked 
to their production process.  In fact, the 
production function of such firms can be 
modeled as using pollution as one of the 
inputs.  The contribution of pollution to 
output in such a case can be considered 
as  positive,  whereas  in  the  case  of 
invasive  species  the  generation  of 
species  has  a  negative  impact  on  the 
output of the resource.  This is precisely 
the  reason  why  the  public  role  in 
invasive species management so far has 
been a policy involving all ‘carrots’ and 
no ‘sticks’.   However, with the recent 
increase  in  pest  infestations  and  their 
potential to affect a large section of the 
economy including both consumers and 
producers,  public  policy  has  been 
increasingly  viewing  the  risk  of  farm-
related pest spread as the farm owner’s 
liability.   
It  is  obvious  that  under  similar 
circumstances  involving  the  above 
analysis, a policy of indemnities instead 
would lead to opposite behavior on the 
part of private agents.  Both monitoring 
and abatement would decrease when the 
regulator subsidizes the resource owner 
for  the  destruction  of  his  resources.  
This is because the higher the payment 
from such losses, the lower would be the 
incentive  to  mitigate  the  loss  through 
spending more time in the non-infested 
state  (r).      Such  a  policy,  though 
intuitive  from  the  societal  welfare 
perspective, leads to perverse incentives 
thus  causing  significant  burden  to  the 
regulators’ exchequer.   
 
Discounting and Socially Optimum 
taxation 
 
So far we have ignored discounting 
of  future  profits  and  considered  the 
optimal decisions from the standpoint of 
the private resource owner.  However, it 
is also of interest to explore the role of 
public  policies  and  factors  such  as 
market  discount  rate,  which  may  be 
beyond  the  private  decision  maker’s 
control.    In  this  section  we  derive  the 
average expected profits in the long run 
from  starting  in  various  states  of  the 
system  such  as  no  infestation, 
infestation  or  quarantine  etc.    It  may 
happen  that,  given  the  costs  incurred 
from  being  in  various  states,  the  net  
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expected  benefits  if  one  starts  in  the 
state  of  infestation  are  lower  or  even 
negative  as  compared  to  the  non-
infestation state.  Such scenarios are of 
crucial interest to the policy maker, who 
can adjust the costs to the farmers in the 
infested state in order to dissuade them 
from going ahead with their production 
plan in order to reduce the social costs 
of pests.  That is, if the resource owner 
finds the discounted sum of profits form 
the  repeated  cycles  of  infestation 
detection and quarantine and back to be 
negative  if  his  current  state  is  of  the 
infested one, he may chose to report the 
infestation rather than risk detection and 
quarantine.    The  regulator  can 
encourage  such  actions  by  offering 
rewards  for  voluntary  disclosures  and 
punishments for detections.   
Following the derivation of average 
expected  discounted  costs  in  Kulkarni 
(1995),  the  relation  between  the 
generator matrix, per period payoffs in 
each  state  and  the  long  run  expected 














































The generator matrix Q is derived 
in the Appendix, g’s are the long run 
expected  benefits  from  starting  in 
                                                 
6 See Kulkarni (1995) pgs. 306-11 for more 
details 
each of the three states and the right 
hand  side  denotes  the  per  period 
profits in each state.  Assume that the 
per  period  profits  in  the  quarantined 
state are –h. We first consider a case 
when  the  private  decision  maker 
considers the option of whether or not 
to  continue  with  production 
depending  upon  the  state  of 
infestation.  The decision to stop may 
be  construed  as  voluntary  disclosure 
of  the  pests  to  the  regulator.    For 
simplicity  we  assume  the  payoffs  in 
each  period  are  net  of  the  optimal 
abatement decisions given the state of 
the art in controlling the pests.  This 
allows  us  to  focus  upon  the  role  of 
such  costs  in  affecting  reporting 
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The  critical  level  of  discount  factor 
below which it becomes optimal for the 
private  agent  to  stop  production  and 
report infestation is derived by solving 
for  0 )) ( ( = x g p  as:  
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Next we explore the optimal tax rate 
(given  the  private  agent’s  discount 
rate)  that  would  make  the  reporting 
decision  beneficial,  and  stopping 
optimal.  This is achieved by inducing 
a  per  period  tax  rate  t  in  the 
infestation  state  X.    Note  that  in 
addition to the costs of quarantine etc. 
incurred in the state of detection, this 
tax  rate  is  charged  based  upon  the 
time  spent  in  state  X.    That  is,  the 
regulator  punishes  the  private  agent 
on  the  principle  that  the  amount  of 
time  spent  in  state  X  would  have  a 
proportional  impact  on  the  social 
costs of infestation due to its spread 
outside  the  region.    This  optimal 
threshold  of  taxation  using  similar 
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Any taxation beyond the above level 
of  threshold  makes  the  private  agents 
profits negative from starting in the state 
of  infestation  and  continuing  without 
reporting.  The taxation threshold for a 
hypothetical set of parameters is shown 
in figure 3.   
There is a great deal of significance 
to  knowing  such  a  threshold  level  of 
taxation.    Most  policies  for  invasive 
species control are reactive in nature and 
are introduced when pests have already 
infested or seriously threaten to infest a 
neighborhood  surrounding  the  private 
resource  (which  is  believed  to  be 
harboring them). Under such a situation, 
the  regulator  has  no  knowledge  of  the 
actual scenario and would need to select 
his taxes such that they are neither too 
low  so  that  the  private  owner  has  no 
incentive to stop when he is infested and 
would prefer the risk of detection, nor 
too high so that private enterprise is not 
severely stifled.   This optimal level of 
taxation  must  lie  between  these  two 
extremes.  
 
Two States of Infestation and 
Sequencing of Taxes and Subsidies 
 
One interesting issue of policy interest is 
whether the sequencing of taxation and 
subsidies  matters.    More  specifically, 
under what circumstances is it optimal 
to  tax  first  and  subsidize  later  or 
subsidize first and tax later, or either tax 
or subsidize only.  This section extends 
the above model to a more general case 
involving  more  than  one  state  of  
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infestation.  In particular, we look at two 
states of infestation X and Y, where the 
state  Y  is  a  transition  from  X  and 
involves higher levels of infestation.  It 
may  be  assumed  that  the  chances  of 
detection are higher at higher levels of 
infestation.    Further  assume  that 
detection in the state X leads to total loss 
of  resources  but  with  an  indemnity 
payment  of  l  through  transition  to  the 
quarantined  state  (l)  and  detection  in 
state Y leads to an indemnity payment of 
h through transition to the quarantined 
state (h).  The rate diagram is shown in 
Figure 4. 
The regulator could make one of the 
states  less  desirable  than  the  other  by 
reducing the relative indemnity payment 
of one state with respect to the other or 
even  making  it  negative.    In  order  to 
simplify  things,  let  us  assume  that  the 
risk of spread to a higher state, given by 
l, is exogenously determined, and the 
only  thing  the  resource  owner  can 
control  is  the  level  of  his  abatement 
efforts.    Expected  profit  maximization 
problem of the resource owner could be 
stated as: 
 
(14)  Max: 
) ( * ) ( * ) ( * )} , (
) ( { ) ( * )} , ( ) ( { ) ( * ) (
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First order condition with respect to 
abatement effort gives
7: 
                                                 
7 The derivation of the steady state 
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In  order  to  study  the  effect  of 
sequencing  of  taxes  and  subsidies  we 
compare the fraction of times the system 
spends  in  each  state  under  different 
policies.    This  would  give  us  an  idea 
over  the  extent  of  externalities 
generated.  For instance, the higher the 
time spent in state Y, the higher may be 
the risk of spread into neighboring areas 
as compared to the time spent in state X.   
Consider a policy of equal subsidies 
in  both  the  states  X  and  Y.    Some 
interesting  sub  cases  (A1-A4)  may  be 
considered: 
 
A.1   
h l =  &  ) ( ) ( x y p p >   ) ( ) ( x p y p > ￿  
 
A.2   
  h l =  &  ) ( ) ( x y p p > ,  ) ( ) ( y d x d <  
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A.3   
h l =  &  ) ( ) ( x y p p < ,  ) ( ) ( y d x d <  
) ( ) ( x p y p < ￿  
 
A.4 
h l <  &  ) ( ) ( x y p p < ,  ) ( ) ( y d x d <  
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A.1  may  occur  when  the  pests  do 
minimal damage to the hosts and most 
of  the  damages  from  them  are  to  the 
neighboring  areas  outside  the  private 
resource  owner.    It  may  also  happen 
when state y also implies a higher level 
of  resources,  i.e.  the  resources  grow 
over  time  and  the  higher  state  of 
infestation may be possible only with a 
higher level of resources.  In such a case 
as  long  as  the  resources  yield  more 
revenues  net  of  damages  from  higher 
level of infestation,  ) ( ) ( x y p p >  would 
imply that in the long run the resource 
owner would have an incentive to keep 
his resources in the state y.  A.2 on the 
other hand is the same as A.1 except that 
an additional assumption is made related 
to the chance of detection being higher 
in the higher state of infestation.  Now it 
is ambiguous whether the system would 
still  spend  more  time  in  state  y  as  it 
would be determined by the parameters 
of  the  model.    Perhaps  with  less  time 
spent in state y, one could make up as 
much revenues as one makes with more 
time in state x.  However, we have not 
made any assumptions about the rate of 
regeneration back into state R.  It may 
happen  that  the  regulator  enforces  a 
higher level of quarantine (for instance, 
number  of  years  required  to  spend  as 
fallow  land  before  replanting)  if  the 
detection  occurs  in  state  y.    This 
assumption can be easily incorporated in 
the differentiation of subsidies or taxes.  
The  third  sub  case,  A.3  is  obvious  as 
with higher level of detection and lower 
level  of  profits  in  state  y,  it  is  less 
profitable  to  spend  more  time  in  it.  
Finally,  when  indemnities  are  based 
upon the stock of infestation, even lower 
revenues  in  state  y  can  provide 
incentives  to  spend  more  time  in  that 
state.  This is shown in case A.4. There 
are  a  number  of  other  sequences 
involving various combinations of taxes 
and subsidies of interest and as intuition 
would suggest it is hard to predict the 
exact outcome unless all the information 
is  available  related  to  the  parameters 
involved.  In the following section we 
explore  some  specific  cases  with  the 
help  of  a  numerical  example  to  gain 
further insights.  
 
A Numerical Example 
 
In order to test our intuition we perform 
some numerical simulations using a set 
of  hypothetical  numbers.    Additional 
assumptions  need  to  be  undertaken 
regarding  the  shape  of  the  cost  and 
revenue  functions.    We  assume  non-
linearity in the costs of abatement and 
effectiveness  of  control  measures  with 
respect to pest mortality.  The specific 
functional  forms  and  parameter  values 
are  presented  in  Tables  1  and  2  in 
Appendix B.  Figure 5 shows the value 
function  of  the  resource  owner  under 
optimal policy, which is convex.  
His  task  is  to  select  the  optimal 
levels  of  abatement  in  the  two 
infestation stages in order to maximize 
his long run expected value.  Next, we  
 
Private Responses to Public Incentives for Invasive Species Management 
Farm & Business: The Journal of the Caribbean Agro-Economic Society (CAES) 
(2007). 7 (1) 80-102 
93 
do  some  simulations  by  changing  the 
parameters  of  the  model  to  see  their 
effects on the optimal abatement efforts 
and  the  steady  state  levels  of  the 
probabilities, which are of relevance to 
the  regulator.    These  simulations  are 
shown in two sets through tables 3 and 
4.  We  consider  a  case  where  the 
revenues to the resource owner from all 
the  three  states  are  the  same.  This 
assumption is made in order to highlight 
the  impact  of  public  policy  on  private 
managers  by  neglecting  the  impact  of 
lower  revenues  in  the  infested  states. 
However,  the  consequences  of 
differential revenues should be obvious 
once the implications from the general 
case are derived.  In table 3 we also fix 
the  arrival  rate  of  species  to  be 
exogenous and unvarying with the state 
of  infestation,  which  is  relaxed  in  the 
later  set  of  simulations.    Finally,  the 
rates of detection too are unvarying with 
the levels  of infestation.   First case in 
table 3 highlights the policy implications 
of a uniform taxation policy in both the 
states  of  infestation.    Notice  that  the 
fraction of time spent in state x is much 
higher as compared to state y despite the 
revenues in the two states being similar.  
This in fact is true for all the cases in 
table 3.  This has to do with the fact that 
whereas the arrival rates of species are 
constant  amongst  the  states,  the  only 
way to reach state y is through x.  On the 
other  hand,  state  x  could  be  reached 
through both r and y.  When there are 
subsidies in state y and taxation in state 
x (case two), the fraction of time spent 
in  state  y  increases  marginally.  
However, the fraction of time spent in 
state x too increases, as that is the only 
way to influence higher arrival rates in 
state  y.    This  detail  was  not  readily 
intuitive through the theoretical analysis 
above and could be of high significance 
for policy purposes, as it highlights the 
specific  linkage  effect  between  states.  
In cases when the social risks posed by 
state y are only marginally higher than 
the  risks  posed  by  state  x,  this  policy 
would  backfire  as  the  fraction  of  time 
spent in x increases despite taxation in x.  
Without understanding this interlinkage, 
however, one may vouch for a policy of 
early  taxation  combined  with  later 
indemnities  thus  producing  inefficient 
outcomes. 
Further, notice that abatement falls 
in state x and is zero in state y.  In this 
case the higher risks from being in state 
x  are  compensated  by  the  reduced 
abatement costs and the higher benefits 
from  being  in  state  y,  which  yields 
rewards through detection in state h.  In 
the third case, when state y is taxed and 
state  x  rewarded,  time  spent  in  x 
increases and y decreases, which should 
be obvious.  Notice, that the time spent 
in the non-infested state (r) is highest in 
this  case  and  the  risk  of  spread  to 
outside  areas  the  least
8.    Finally, 
                                                 
8 We have assumed that the risks of disease 
spread are highest in state y, which is of 
major policy concern to the regulator.    
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subsidies  in  the  two  states  yield  the 
highest  amounts  of  time  spent  in  the 
infested states and the least amounts of 
time spent in the non-infested one.  
So far, the results are very obvious.  
However, now allowing for more reality 
we  relax  the  assumptions  of  uniform 
levels  of  arrival  and  detection  rates  in 
the  two  infested  states.      Besides,  we 
also  assume  that  the  amount  of  time 
spent in the detection states (l and h) is 
much  higher,  which  is  given  by  the 
lower  levels  of  departure  rate  out  of 
these states
9.  The results of the new set 
of simulations are demonstrated in table 
4  in  the  Appendix.    First,  notice  that 
with an increase in arrival and detection 
rates in state y, the fraction of time spent 
in state y is uniformly higher than x all 
through out.  Further, the revenues are 
uniformly  lower  as  the  system  spends 
more time in the detected states, which 
yields much lower (10 compared to 90) 
revenue.  Notice  two  striking  results 
from these sets of simulations.  A policy 
of uniform taxation in both states (case 
1)  does  not  yield  the  lowest  levels  of 
risk in state y and a policy of uniform 
subsidies (case 4) does not produce the 
highest  levels  of  risk  in  the  higher 
infested state y.  Let’s explore the case 
of taxation first.  The lowest level of risk 
in  fact  is  attained  when  the  regulator 
                                                 
9 This can be rationalized as the increase in 
quarantine time that the detected farm is 
required to spend before resuming 
production.  
follows a policy of subsidizing the lower 
infested  state  and  taxing  the  higher 
infested state (case 3).  When y is taxed 
and  x  is  subsidized,  the  abatement 
efforts in state x are lower and state y are 
higher  as  compared  to  the  case  when 
both  the  states  are  taxed  (case  1).    In 
case three, it pays to spend less time in 
Y by abating more.  Notice that higher 
abatement in Y also increase the rate of 
arrival into state X which is now more 
beneficial  compared  to  case  1.  Lower 
abatement  in  state  x  serves  two 
purposes.    It  increases  the  fraction  of 
time  spent  in  state  x  directly  and  also 
indirectly through a higher detection rate 
in state l.  Note that the later purpose is 
even more beneficial as it increases the 
time  spent in  state  r,  which  yields the 
most  rewards.    Whereas,  it  pays  to 
increase abatement marginally in state y 
as it increases the arrival rate back into 
state x and consequential bouncing back 
to  states  r  via  l  while  simultaneously 
lowering the costs of abatement efforts.  
Note  that  the  reduction  in  abatement 
efforts in state x in case 3 has a higher 
impact  on  steady  state  probability  of 
state l as compared to state y.  Similarly, 
abatement effort in state x has a higher 
impact on the steady state probability of 
state  y  than  the  impact  of  abatement 
effort  in  state  y  itself.    As  a 
consequence,  time  spent  in  state  l 
increases and that in y decreases.   
Similar  analysis  will  explain  the 
anomaly  in  the  case  when  uniform 
subsidization yields lower risks in state  
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y  than  a  policy  of  taxing  state  x  and 
rewarding  state  y.      Note  that  under 
uniform subsidies in both states (case 4), 
the  amount  of  time  spent  in  the  non-
infested  state  is  lower  than  that  under 
case  2.    In  case  2  taxation  in  state  2 
leads to higher abatement efforts in that 
state.  However, in order to make up for 
the loss of revenues, abatement effort in 
state y falls too relative to state 4.  This 
ensures that the time spent in state y and 
h are higher than before, thus leading to 
societal risks.    
To  recoup  the  assumptions  that 
make  this  kind  of  result  possible:  1.  
Owners’ resources remain unaffected by 
pests  and  the  only  threats  are  to  the 
outside  world.    2.    Rate  of  further 
infestation  increases  when  stocks  are 
already infested.  3.  The detection rates 
are  higher  in  the  higher  state  of 
infestation.  4.  The level of subsidies 
and  taxation  is  exogenously  specified 
(which  may  be  related  to  the  level  of 
resources  or  other  factors).    5.  
Abatement  costs  are  non-linear  and 
increasing in abatement.  6.  Death rates 
are  non-linear  and  increasing  in 
abatement efforts.   
When assumption 1 is relaxed it is 
possible that results change if there are 
higher  losses  associated  with  higher 
levels of infestation.  However, it is the 
difference in the relative revenues in the 
three states that will determine the shape 
of the outcome combined with the other 
parameters that played a key role above.  
For  instance,  even  when  reducing  the 
level of revenues in state y to 80 while 
keeping others constant, the same results 




A  number  of  results  come  out  of  the 
above analysis.  First, the single state of 
infestation model derives the condition 
for  optimal  abatement  and  monitoring 
efforts of the private resource manager 
when  only  the  long  run  expected 
rewards are considered.  Private efforts 
are affected not only by the biological 
parameters such as the arrival and death 
rates of species, but also by the expected 
revenues  in  the  various  states.    The 
regulator can affect both of these factors 
through his policies.  For instance, the 
length  of  quarantine  would  determine 
the time the resources will yield no or 
negative profits.  In order to achieve a 
socially optimal level of risk of spread 
(given by the fraction of time spent in 
the  higher  state  of  infestation  Y)  the 
optimal  tax  rate  must  incorporate  the 
above parameters as shown in case with 
optimal taxation under discounting.  The 
threshold  level  of  taxation  is  higher 
when the revenues in state Y are higher, 
and  is  lower  when  the  arrival  rate  of 
species is higher (Figure 3).  The second 
result  may  seem  counter  intuitive,  but 
note that under a higher arrival rate of 
species the private resource owner has 
lower  profits.    Finally,  the  numerical 
examples  highlight  interesting  cases 
where  sequencing  of  taxation  and  
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subsidies  may  yield  different  levels  of 
risks  of  spread.    This  is  an  important 
issue for policy-making purposes as the 
regulator often has to decide about the 
correct  way  of  providing  both  and 
carrots  and  sticks  so  that  minimum 
perverse incentives are generated.  It is 
even  more  important  under  situations 
where little information is available over 
the  biological  parameters  or  the  profit 
function  of  the  private  agents.    Under 
such a situation it may not be possible to 
design an optimal level of taxation and 
subsidy  policy.  As  a  consequence, 
regulators resort to fixed or lump sum 
payment  or  taxation  schemes  like  the 
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In order to solve for the long run steady state probabilities of the states we need to make sure that the rate of exit from a 
state is the same as the rate of entry into it. For instance, as shown in figure 2, the rate of exit from state R is given 
by l ) (R p , where as the rate of entry into it is given by q q d ) ( ) ( ) ( h p l p x p + + .  Using similar logic we get five 
equations corresponding to the five states as below: 
 
(16)  l ) (R p = q q d ) ( ) ( ) ( h p l p x p + +  
(17)  d l l d ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( y p R p d x p x p x p + = + +  
(18)  l d ) ( ) ( ) ( x p y p d y p = +  
(19)  d x p l p ) ( ) ( = q  
(20)  d y p h p ) ( ) ( = q  
 
However, one of the equations above will be redundant, and therefore, we also make use of the fact that the sum of the 
fraction of times spent in each state must equal 1: 
 
(21)  1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( = + + + + R P y p x p h p l p  
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Table 1: Functional Forms 
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Table 2: Base Case Parameters 





Table 3:  ) (r p = 90;  ) (x p =90;  ) (y p =90; a0 = 1; a1 = 1; l?￿ = 2; d = 3; q?￿ = 15; 
  A (x), a 
(y) 
Revenue  P (x)  P (y)  P (r)  P (l)  P (h) 
L = -10, H = 
-10 
2.1, 0  83.65  .149  .099  .702  .029  .02 
L = -10, H = 
10 
2, 0  84.05  .154  .103  .692  .031  .021 
L = 10, H = -
10 
2, 1  84.3  .165  .083  .703  .033  .017 
L = 10, H = 
10 
1.75, 0  84.7  .166  .111  .668  .033  .022 
 
 
Table 4:  ) (r p = 90;  ) (x p = 90;  ) (y p = 90; a0 = 1; a1= 1;  ) (x l  = 2;  ) (y l = 50; d (x) = 3; d (y) 
= 5; q?￿ = 5; 
Cases   Conditions  a(x), a(y)  Revenu
e 
P (x)  P (y)  P (r)  P (l)  P (h) 
Case 1  L = -10, H = -
10 
6.29,1.65  71.1  .0192  0.1245  0.7203  0.0115  0.1245 
Case 2  L = -10, H = 
10 
25.4, .9  73.9  .0177  0.1526  0.6665  0.0106  0.1526 
 
Case 3  L = 10, H = -
10 
6.21, 1.74  71.3  0.0198  0.1236  0.7211  0.0119  0.1236 






Figure 1:  Invasive Species Management: Trends in Emergency Program  
Expenditures, USDA Briefing Room 
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Figure 5:  The value function for the private resource owner in the base case 
 